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( fie fen d a n i' Ev-? n A n d e r s o n /

:f a
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d e c e d e n t w a s operating at the time of his d e d t h .
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The fo] 1 owi i ig j ssi les ar e p r e s e n t e d for r e v i e w i n thi s a p p e a l :
1.

Is a n o n - o p e r a t i n g m i n e r a 1 i n t e r e s t o w i i e i

siich a s

Defendant Red Dome, Inc., subject to liability for statutory
nuisance?
2.

Was the question of nuisance properly addressed by the

trial Court?
3.

Did Defendant Evan Anderson have a duty to warn the

operator of faulty machinery?
4.

Does the Utah Fencing Statute

(Utah Code Annotated,

Section 40-5-1, 1953 as amended) , apply to open-pit excavations
such as the one into which the decedent fell?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC.
The interpretation of Section 40-5-1, and Sections 76-10-801
and 76-10-803, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Proceedings Below
This wrongful death action was brought to recovery damages for
the death of LeRoy Turnbaugh, who was killed when the front-end
loader he was operating rolled into an 18 to 20 foot deep open-pit
mining excavation.

Plaintiff's claims were based upon (1)

Defendant Red Dome's conduct in contributing to, and supporting, a
nuisance; (2) Defendant Red Dome's violation of Section 40-5-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended (the Utah Fencing Statute);
and (3) Negligence on the part of Defendant Evan Anderson in
failing to warn the lessee of the equipment as to the machine's
potentially lethal mechanical problems (R.l-4).
In defense of the foregoing claims, Defendant Red Dome denied
the nuisance allegations, and claimed that even assuming the
2

existence of a nuisance, Plaintiff's claims were barred by the
doctrines of comparative negligence and assumption of the risk
(R.5-9). Defendant Red Dome, Inc. further maintained that as a mere
non-operating mineral interest owner who received $55,000.00 a year
as a completely unconnected and sterilized onlooker, said Defendant
owed no duty to LeRoy Turnbaugh and was therefore exempt from the
statutory nuisance provisions. Relative to the claims based on the
Utah Fencing Statute, Defendant Red Dome simply took the position
that the statute did not apply to open-pit excavations such as the
one into which the decedent fell.

Defendant Anderson's defense was

based upon comparative negligence, assumption of the risk, and the
alleged absence of any duty as between said Defendant and the
decedent.
The Defendants moved for Summary Judgment (R.25-28), which
Motion was denied (R.93).
The case was set for a bench trial before the Honorable Ray
Harding.

At the close of trial, Plaintiff moved to amend its

Complaint to allege the maintenance of a nuisance by Defendant
Anderson, pursuant to Rule 15 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
Motion was denied (Tr.217-218).
The Court ruled in favor of both Defendants finding no cause
of action on the part of the Plaintiff

(R.164-166).

More

specifically, the Court concluded that Defendant Red Dome, Inc. did
not create a nuisance, that Defendant Red Dome, Inc. had no duty
toward the decedent by virtue of Red Dome's status as a nonoperational mineral interest owner, and that the Utah Fencing
3

Statute does not apply to open-pit excavations such as the one at
issue.

As to Defendant Anderson, the trial Court found that he was

not negligent.

In the trial Court's Memorandum Decision, it did

not address the issue of whether or not the scene of the accident
constituted a nuisance, and if so, whether Defendant Red Dome, Inc.
as owner of the hazardous mining claims, aided in creating, or
contributed to the nuisance, or supported, continued, or retained
the nuisance, as specified in the Utah Nuisance Statute (R.164,
166) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 6, 1983, LeRoy Turnbaugh, a resident of Fillmore,
Utah, was killed when the front-end loader he was operating rolled
backwards into an open-pit excavation situated on a mining claim
owned by Defendant Red Dome, Inc. (Tr.10,11).

The loader had been

leased by Defendant Evan Anderson to the decedent's employer
(Tr.109, 129). There was no fuel gauge on the loader (Tr.24), and
the loader apparently ran out of fuel (Tr.23) , thereby rendering
the brakes and the steering of the loader inoperable (Tr.91).

The

loader rolled backwards (Tr.28) over the vertical edge of a mining
pit which was 18 to 20 feet deep (Tr.29).

The decedent was crushed

under the loader.
Defendant Evan Anderson did not inform Don Peterson of the
fact that when the engine stopped on the loader which killed LeRoy
Turnbaugh, that, in that event, the steering was not operable nor
were the brakes (Tr.26).

This is of great importance in that there

was no fuel gauge on this particular machine, and if the machine
4

were to run out of fuel the steering and the brakes became
inoperable when the engine died.

Don Peterson rode with the

decedent the day before the accident in a loader which was not the
same as the loader which killed LeRoy Turnbaugh (Tr.117), although
testimony was that except in size they were similar. Evan Anderson
testified that he did not indicate to decedent LeRoy Turnbaugh nor
Don Peterson, decedent's employer, that there was no fuel gauge on
the subject loader nor that when the subject loader ran out of fuel
the engine died, thus rendering the steering and braking of the
machine inoperable (Tr.113).
Defendant Red Dome, Inc. had an operating agreement with the
Sorenson Brothers whereby the Sorensons operated the mining
operation of the property owned by Defendant Red Dome, Inc. and
paid to Red Dome, Inc. a royalty which in the year 1983 amounted to
$55,000.00 (Tr.143).
Mr. Gordon Griffen, the only employee, chief operating officer
and sole stockholder of Red Dome, Inc. (Tr.131, 132), testified
that the area containing the mining claims was extremely rough,
dangerous and could constitute a hazard (Tr.135, 141); however, it
was of no concern to Red Dome, Inc. (Tr.137, 138).
The mining claim where the accident occurred was pock-marked
with pits such as the one in which the decedent was killed (Tr.19),
yet said mining claims were entirely devoid of berms, fences,
warning signs, or other safety measures (Tr.31-33, 132, 136-140,
155-156) to minimize the danger of falling into the hazardous open-

5

pit excavations, some of which were within five or six feet off of
a public roadway.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The nuisance statutes of Utah as set out under Section 76-

10-801 and 76-10-803, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, apply to
a "mere owner" of real property such as mining property even when
the said owner is not the operator of the mining property.
2.

If the appellate Court finds that a "mere owner" of

property, on which there exists a nuisance, can be held liable for
damage incurred because of such nuisance, then, and in that event,
this

matter

should be remanded

to the Trial Court for a

determination of whether or not a nuisance existed in the subject
case.

The Trial Court did not rule on the question of whether or

not there was a nuisance.

The Trial Court in its Memorandum

Decision treated the nuisance as if it were negligence referring to
"standard of reasonable care" and "duty toward" the Plaintiff who
"at the most was upon the property as a licensee."
3.

The Trial Court erred in failing to find that Defendant

Evan Anderson had a duty to warn the operator or the lessee of his
machinery that the machinery had a dangerous proclivity which was
inherent and hidden to the uninitiated.
4.

The Trial Court erred in stating that Section 40-5-1 of

the Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, the Utah Fencing Statute,
"does not apply to open-pit excavations, such as the one at issue
herein, that are relatively shallow and conspicuous to the
reasonably prudent person."
6

ARGUMENT
I
A NON-OPERATING MINERAL INTEREST OWNER SUCH AS DEFENDANTRESPONDENT RED DOME, INC., IS SUBJECT TO LIABILITY FOR
STATUTORY NUISANCE IN UTAH.
The Trial Court in its Memorandum Decision, (R. 165) cites the
case of Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978) in support of
its conclusion that "where there is a dangerous condition on one's
property which is just as observable to an invitee as to the owner,
the owner has no duty to warn or to protect the invitee except to
observe the universal standard of reasonable care under the
circumstances."

The Ellertson case involved a landowner who had

done a rather shoddy job of tying his horse up to a post.

The

tether slipped down to the base of the post and the horse became
entangled.

The landowner asked a passerby to assist him in

untangling the horse.

In the process of trying to untangle the

horse, it reared and struck the invitee, who then filed an action
against the landowner.

These facts are a far cry from those set

forth herein, and in fact do not indicate the maintenance of a
nuisance.

The Ellertson action was based upon claims of

negligence, a breach of duty to exercise ordinary care.
The trial judge seems to say herein that the Utah nuisance
statute does not apply because Defendant Red Dome, Inc. owed no
duty to decedent.

That logic seems to ignore the obvious, namely,

that the statute created the duty because in common law there is no
duty.

7

The Trial Court cited two Oregon cases, Catale v. Vanport
Manufacturing, Inc., 738 P.2d 599 (Oregon App. 1987) and Ashland v.
Pacific Power and Light Company, 395 P.2d 420 (Oregon 1964), which
cases held that owners who do not retain any right to control the
property, exercise any control over their property, could not be
held liable for the death of a child in a pond built by an owner's
employee who resided on owner's property.

The Trial Court states

in its decision herein, (R. 166),
"The analogous situation existed here where the owner Red
Dome, Inc. only collected royalties from those that mined the
minerals and had no control whatsoever over their operations.
Red Dome, Inc. cannot therefore be held to answer for any
alleged negligence or nuisance created by any of the
successive mining companies that worked upon his land."
Nuisance is defined at Section 76-10-801, Utah Code Annotated
1953 as amended, as follows:
(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition
whatsoever that is dangerous to human life or health or
renders soil, air, water, or food impure or unwholesome.
(2) Any person whether as owner, agent, or occupant who
creates, aids in creating, or contributes to a nuisance, or
who supports, continues, or retains a nuisance, is guilty of a
Class B misdemeanor. (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Gordon Griffen, the sole stockholder of DefendantRespondent Red Dome, Inc., (Tr. 132) knew that there was no
fencing, no barriers, no signs indicating danger, nor berms around
the lips of the pit in the mining area (Tr. 138) , that he visited
the area, "probably an average of three times a year," (Tr. 135)
and responded to a question, "You generally recognize the area of
the mining claims as being potentially very hazardous, don't you?"
(Tr. 141) as follows:
8

Answer: If one were to go out there by themselves or
walk across the area in our claims and outside our claims and
you happen to trip and fall, I think you would be in trouble.
If you couldn't get out by yourself, the heat would get you
one day or the cold get you in the night* I don't think that
you could — I don't think there is a place there that you
could easily get to and jump off and hurt yourself. I will
say maybe you might be able to find a place but on the flat
generally no.
Question: There are as Mr. Anderson admitted several
hundred large pits there.
Answer:

Depends on what you mean by large of course.

Then at Tr. 142 counsel showed Mr. Griffen Defendants' Exhibit 14
and asked,
"Is that typical however of the size of the pits, several
hundred pits, that were in existence out there?
Answer:
bigger.

Well, some would be bigger, some would be

Mr. Griff en stated that from the first of June 1983 through
the 30th of May (presumably in 1984) his royalty from the operation
of the mine amounted to $55,000.00, (Tr. 143).
Mr. Griffen stated, (Tr. 137) that he had licensed the mining
operation to people who "would operate in a safe and proper
manner."

The safety and operation then became

the

sole

responsibility of the people who were mining the property,
according to Mr. Griffen.

Mr. Griffen stated that he left the

whole question up to the mining operators and the government
inspectors who were trained in the area of safety.
When asked, (Tr. 136)
"Did you in that regard ever establish or seek to establish
the maintenance of berms or barriers along the highways or
around any of the open pits?
Answer:

No. That was outside my jurisdiction."
9

The whole of the testimony of Mr. Griff en followed the line
that indeed the area was one which could be considered dangerous
but that Defendant-Respondent Red Dome, Inc. had "no right" to
impose itself upon the licensee mining operator in the field of
safe operation.
As a matter of fact, the Trial Court ignored the testimony by
Mr. Griffen to the effect that the operation of the mine "in a safe
and proper manner" was involved in the licensing agreement between
Defendant-Respondent Red Dome, Inc. and the mining operators (Tr.
137).

Therefore, although the control of the licensee on the

question of safety was not set out item by item, apparently it did
exist and the Trial Court was in error to state that DefendantRespondent Red Dome, Inc. "had no control whatsoever over their
operation."

Defendant-Respondent Red Dome, Inc. really can't be

bothered with such boring details, but it is submitted

that

$55,000.00 per year is sufficient to go to a modicum of trouble,
especially when so ordered by statute.
Utah is a mining state and therefor this Court should give
careful consideration to the balancing of the equities between the
mining interests and the rights of the public to a certain amount
of precautions on the part of mining operators and owners. This is
especially true where the proximity of a public highway to danger
appears to be in some cases five or six feet, (R.163, Ex. 8, 17,
28) .
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II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING A FINDING AS TO
WHETHER OR NOT A NUISANCE EXISTED IN THE SUBJECT CASE,
The Trial Court did not make a finding as to whether or not
the situation involving the dangerous pits on the 650 acres of land
(Tr. 134) did or did not constitute a nuisance but only addressed
the question of whether or not a nonoperating owner had a duty to
an invitee.
In the 1982 case of Radloff vs. State, 323 NW 2d 541, Mich.
App., the owner of lands leased the lands to a company, which
company dug a gravel pit which was later filled with water.

The

Court found that the evidence indicated that the State (owner) knew
that the gravel pit was unsafe for public use but made no effort to
discourage its use by the public or to contour the embankment to
make the area safe.

The Court found that there was an intentional

nuisance created and the Court quoted from the case of Denny vs.
Garavaglia, 52 NW 2d 521, (Mich. 1952), where the Court stated that
"an intentional nuisance means not that the existence of a nuisance
was intended by the creator but, rather, that the creator intended
to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a
nuisance."
In 1978 the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Vincent v. Salt
Lake County, 583 P.2d 105 found that the following instructions to
the jury given by the Trial Court was a correct statement of the
law regarding the intentional creation or maintenance of a private
nuisance,
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"A nuisance is a condition, not an act or failure to act on
the part of the person responsible for the condition. If the
wrongful condition exists, and the person charged therewith is
responsible for damages to others, although he may have used
the highest possible degree of care to prevent or minimize the
deleterious effects. Recovery in an action for a nuisance
cannot be defeated by showing that there was no negligence on
the part of the defendant.
A nuisance does not rest on the degree of care used, for that
presents a question of negligence, but on the degree of danger
existing even with the best of care, the question of care or
one of care is not involved. Thus, a person who creates or
maintains a nuisance is liable for the resulting injury to
others, without regard to the degree of care of skill
exercised by him to avoid the injury, and notwithstanding that
he exercises reasonable or ordinary care and skill, or even
the highest possible degree of care."
Thus it can be seen that the Trial Court herein applied only
the legal concepts surrounding the law of negligence such as
standard of care, status of plaintiff

(licensee, invitee,

trespasser, etc.), assumption of the risk, etc.
The Trial Court seems to be under the impression that the
absence of a duty on the part of Defendant-Respondent Red Dome,
and/or the presence of assumption of the risk or contributory
negligence on the part of Mr. Turnbaugh, is somehow fatal to a
cause of action based upon statutory nuisance.

While this was

precisely the position taken by counsel for Defendant-Respondent
Red Dome in his Closing Argument
contrary to current Utah law.

(Tr.220), such notions are

Further, it is well established

under Utah law, that contributory negligence is not a defense to a
nuisance action, Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267,
276 (Ut. 1982).

(See also discussion at R.58 herein.)

The Trial Court did not even address the issue of whether or
not the conditions created on the land by licensees and supported,
12

continued and retained by Defendant-Respondent Red Dome, Inc. did
in fact constitute a nuisance.

The subject case should be remanded

to the Trial Court for ascertainment of this fact.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE THAT THE FRONTEND LOADER OPERATED BY THE
DECEDENT WAS DEFECTIVE OR WAS IMPROPERLY MAINTAINED.
Testimony of Defendant-Respondent Anderson, the owner of the
machine which decedent was operating at the time of his death, was to
the effect that the machine was properly maintained by said
Defendant.

In contrast, the testimony of witness Michael James

Haveron, an ex-employee of Defendant-Respondent Anderson, indicated
that the so-called maintenance was minimal, to the say the least (Tr.
97).
Question: Can you give us a general description of the
general condition of the loaders that were being utilized by
Fillmore Products during the time that you were there?
Answer: The one that I ran was in pretty poor shape. We
didn't have the money to take care of all the maintenance
items that it needed.
Question: Was Mr. Evan Anderson aware of the problems
with the loaders?
Answer:

Yes

Question: When you say there were problems with the
loader you were using but didn't have the money, what types of
problems were there?
Answer: There were a lot of hydraulic leaks there common
with them. We had a pretty big leak with the steering system,
(Tr. 98).
Again, the same witness under cross examination by DefendantRespondent's counsel at Tr. 102 at Line 11:
Question: Was it your job also to supervise the
13

maintenance of the equipment?
Answer: Yes.
Question:
the equipment?

Then was there a lot of maintenance done on

Answer: We did a fair amount. Not everything we needed
to do because there wasn't enough funds.
Question: There wasn't any maintenance done?
maintenance done on the loaders?

There was

Answer:
When it came to a shutdown point we do
maintenance. When the machine would not operate we would fix
whatever was wrong.
And again at Tr. 103 on cross examination:
Question: And what about the operation of just basically
checking the operation of steering and brakes and so forth,
whose duty was that to report any problems?
Answer: They would be reported to me and I would talk to
Evan about it.
Question:

Who would report to you?

Answer: The operator, which at the time was Richard
Scott. It was common knowledge with us all that we had a
problem with the steering and brakes. The brakes commonly
Question:

Say that again.

Answer: The steering we knew we had a problem with that
because it would veer from side to side if you weren't
accustomed to the play that was in the system and the brakes
would go out.
However, regardless of whether or not the maintenance was of a
high degree, there was an inherent danger with the subject loader in
that if it ran out of fuel, the engine would stop.

If the engine

stopped, the brakes would cease to work and the steering would cease
to work (Tr. 25-256) .

It was testified by Mr. Anderson that the

characteristic of the steering failing to work when the engine quit

14

was a characteristic of its manufacture, (Tr. 39) and under crossexamination at Tr. 40 when asked,
So when the engine quit and you had no hydraulic pressure
then you could not steer?
Answer:

That is correct.

Not only did Mr. Anderson know about these two inherently
dangerous characteristics of the particular machine but he did not
point them out to Mr. Don Peterson to whom he was "loaning" his
machinery.

Here it will be noted that Mr. Peterson testified that he

was allowing Mr. Anderson credit for the money that Mr. Anderson owed
him for the use of his loader. On direct examination he testified at
Tr. 109:
Question: I see. In other words you recall in your
deposition testifying that you were paying Evan Anderson $15
to $20 a load, you couldn't remember?
Answer: Yes, this has been a policy for a long time. I
have used his loader off and on for four, five or six years,
the amount of time he was down there. Whenever he did that I
just put it on his account.
Question: Instead of actually paying him money, you were
deducting what he owed you?
Answer: Right.
Mr. Anderson not only knew of the above set forth inherently
dangerous characteristics of the machine, but he did not warn Mr.
Peterson of the fact.
Question: Now did you at any time prior to the accident
advise Don Peterson of the fact that this loader would lose
its braking capabilities and steering capabilities in the
event that the motor stopped running?
Answer: I don't remember that conversation if in fact it
took place, but, you know, as I say, I had that loader for a
couple of years before that and Don had used it several times.
Just a specific conversation as to me telling him the brakes
15

didn"t work after the engine stopped or the steering didn't
work, I don't remember having that conversation. But Don was
an experienced operator. Maybe I didn't feel like I had to.
(Tr. 26-27).
There was conflicting testimony as to the maintenance, whether
good or bad, of Defendant Anderson's equipment and as regards the
credibility of the witnesses, Defendant Anderson was testifying in
his own behalf whereas the witness Haveron was in no way connected to
the Plaintiff or the Defendants and as far as could be ascertained
was a completely unbiased witness.

It is submitted that the Trial

Court's finding of proper maintenance flew directly in the face of
the evidence.
Regardless of the maintenance of the loader, the DefendantRespondent Anderson was under a duty as a bailor for hire to warn the
bailee of any inherent defects in the equipment bailed, especially
when the defects were so crucial to the safe operation of the said
machine, to-wit brakes and steering.

This of course was of much

larger importance when taken together with the lack of a fuel gauge
(Tr. 24), meaning that the operator had to stand up to look into the
overhead opening of the fuel tank to guess if there were or were not
fuel contained in the said tank.

It is submitted that an operator

could be busy at all times of the operation and could not quickly and
accurately check the amount of fuel in the tank at a given time.
The neglect of installing a new fuel gauge, coupled with the
failure to warn either Peterson or decedent of the inherent dangers
of the particular loader, constituted culpable negligence on the part
of Defendant-Respondent Anderson.
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IV
THE UTAH FENCING STATUTE, (40-5-1), SHOULD APPLY TO
OWNERS OF LAND ON WHICH THERE IS AN OPEN-PIT TYPE
EXCAVATION,
The scope of the Utah Fencing Statute, Utah Code Annotated
Section 40-5-1, appears to be an issue of first impression in Utah.
Since the Statute became law in 1898, it appears to have been cited
in only one reported Court Opinion, entitled Ewell vs. The United
States, 579 Fed. Supp. 1291 (CD. Utah, 1984).

The Court in that

case never reached the issue of the scope of the Utah Fencing Statute
because the Court found that the Defendants therein were immune from
liability in any event by virtue of the Utah Landowners Liability
Act, which shields landowners from liability for recreational
landusers' injuries sustained on the landowners' property.
In the case at bar the Trial Court concluded that the Utah
Fencing Statute did not apply to open-pit excavations such as the one
in which the appellant's deceased husband fell. (R. 165)
The Trial Court in its Memorandum Decision stated that the
Ochampaugh vs. City, 588 P.2d

1351

(Wash. 1979) was highly

"persuasive and cogent in view of the facts set forth in trial in
this matter." (R. 164)

The facts in that case were that two young

boys drowned in a pond that had been formed many years prior by the
filling up of an excavation.

The Court held that such an excavation

filled with water was not an "excavation" within meaning of statute
requiring persons digging, sinking or excavating any "shaft,
excavation or hole" to fence it so as to securely guard the danger to
persons and animals falling into such shafts or excavations.
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The Trial Court herein stated that the same case, to-wit,
Ochampaugh vs. City, cited an earlier precedent that held that the
Washington statute applied only to excavations, "the area of which on
the surface is relatively small and which can be fenced without great
expense."

The actual quote that the Trial Court was referring to was

from McDermott vs. Kaczmarek, 2 Wash. App. 643, 469 P.2d 191 (1970).
The actual quote from this case was "that it was meant (the
Washington fencing statute) to apply only to excavations of the pit
type, the area of which on the surface is relatively small and which
can be fenced without great expense.

Nothing was said about

"relatively shallow and conspicuous to the reasonably prudent person"
as was said by the Trial Court herein.
The writer has not been able to find a case where a fencing
statute has been held to apply in mining states to an excavation that
is filled with water as in the Ochampaugh case or a ditch containing
water as the Court in Ochampaugh cites the case of Barnhart vs.
Chicago M & St. Paul R.R., 89 Wash. 304, 154 P.441, a 1916 case.
This is a case of first impression in Utah, as stated supra,
but here we do not have a body of water, a mine shaft that had a door
on it where a boy enters voluntarily; the bad air inside kills the
boy.

Nor is the subject case a large pit that would be completely

unreasonable to fence, such as Bingham Canyon excavation for
Kennecott Copper mine.

Here we have a relatively short space that

could be fenced from 90-degree angles from the highway a relatively
short distance on each side, or as a matter of fact, each excavation
could be quickly fenced as it was finished, or in the bare minimum,
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berms could be pushed up to at least two vertical feet surrounding
each excavation, making it quite a deterrent to rolling into the open
pit.

If a person or animal were walking in this area at night

without a light, there is no question that the absence of a broken
leg in a 10-minute walk would be nothing short of a miracle.
The statute says, "The owner, lessee or agent of any mine who
by working such mine has caused, or may hereafter cause, the surface
of the public domain, or of any highway, or other lands, to cave in
and form a pit or sink into which persohs or animals are likely to
fall shall cause such pit or sink to be filled up, or to be securely
enclosed with a substantial fence at least four and one-half feet
high;...."

Here again statute has created a duty where none existed

at common law.
It is submitted that it would take more than a strict
construction of the statute to seriously contend that a cave-in
appearing on the surface of land caused by underground mining which
"formed a pit or sink into which persons or animals are likely to
fall" to be different in legal construction from a mining statute
designed to protect unwary people and animals where the pit or sink
was formed by miners working from the surface down.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether or not the frontend loader was properly
maintained is not dispositive as to the negligence of DefendantRespondent Anderson in not apprising Don Peterson or his operator of
the inherent dangers in the machine that he was renting to them.
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These dangers were well known to him, and he merely thought that Mr.
Peterson would know of them, without telling him, of course.
The Trial Court should be reversed on this holding.
The facts surrounding the ownership and operation of the
subject mining claim are that a one-man corporation has been paid
$55,000.00 a year for a license to mine the said property.

The owner

of this land, or to be more precise, the sole employee, chief
executive officer and only stockholder of the corporation that is the
owner of this land shrugs off any concern he should have regarding
the safety of the open-pit mine operation on his land in a totally
cavalier fashion.
The Trial Court is totally convinced that even if there were a
nuisance, a mere owner and nonoperator of the land would not be
liable for any damages flowing from a nuisance on the land if indeed
the nuisance did exist.
Plaintiff-Appellant submits that it was clear error as a
matter of law for the Trial Court to substitute a "control test"
taken from Oregon case law in the place of the clear language of the
statutory nuisance test in Section 76-10-801, Utah Code Annotated
1953 as amended, upon which Plaintiff-Appellant has relied since the
inception of this action.

For this reason, this case should be

remanded with instructions for the Trial Court to determine whether
Defendant-Respondent Red Dome, Inc. aided in creating, contributed
to, supported, continued or retained a nuisance in violation of
statute.
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An owner, especially one who is cognizant of the danger
surrounding the mining operation, is liable to the public and to an
invitee for damage resulting from the maintenance of a nuisance, 7610-801, supra, and Vincent v. Salt Lake County, supra.
Although the fencing statute as set forth in 40-5-1 has been
around many years, this case is a case of first impression in Utah
and should stand for the proposition that the person or persons who
take treasure from the earth should maintain their operation in a
manner that does not construct "traps for the unwary" or in fact 20foot holes that have perpendicular sides and no indication of any
kind at the lip of such a pit.
The case should be reversed and remanded for a hearing as to
the question of damages.

Respectfully submitted,

D. M. AMOSS
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
If D. M. Amoss, attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant in the above
Appeal, certify that on October

7^/ , 1988, four copies of the

within brief were served upon Defendant-Respondent by mailing them,
first-class, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

Dexter L. Anderson
Attorney at Law
S. R. Box 5 2
Fillmore, Utah 84631
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